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Abstract
This article uses data from randomized evaluations in Indiana and Dela-
ware to address three questions: (1) Are welfare recipients who receive federal
housing assistance less employable than recipients who do not? (2) How does
the impact of welfare reform compare for families with and without housing
assistance? (3) Does welfare reform increase or decrease the use of such
assistance?
Although public housing residents may be more disadvantaged than
welfare recipients who do not get housing assistance, voucher users and Section
8 project-based recipients were not. Welfare reform had similar impacts on the
earnings and welfare benefits of families that received housing assistance and
those that did not. Where impacts did differ, they were larger for families
receiving assistance. Welfare reform also reduced the receipt of housing assis-
tance. Families that receive assistance appear to have less financial strain than
families that do not, suggesting that assistance may increase overall financial
stability. 
Keywords: Housing assistance programs; Social experiment; Welfare 
Introduction
The substantial overlap in populations served by the welfare and housing
programs means that these programs have the potential to strongly affect each
other. Nationally, about 30 percent of families on welfare receive federal hous-
ing assistance from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD). Conversely, about half of all HUD-assisted families with children
received some income from welfare in 1996, the year federal welfare reform
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was enacted, while about 27 percent did in 2000.1 Any interactive effects of the
two programs would have implications for how state welfare agencies and
housing programs might target resources and provide a rationale for a more
coordinated approach to welfare and housing assistance.
If welfare reform is more effective for families that get housing assistance
than for those that do not, then policy makers may want to explore why this
is the case and how to better integrate the programs to take advantage of
potentially positive spillovers. Helping recipients become self-sufficient is a
frequently mentioned goal of welfare reform, and it is important to know
whether housing assistance does this. If welfare reform is less effective for fami-
lies that also receive housing assistance, it is important to determine whether
this is because of exogenous differences in client characteristics or because of
adverse interactions between incentives in the two programs. In the latter case,
policy changes may be needed to better align incentives.
Simple economic theory posits that welfare recipients who receive housing
assistance should work fewer hours than other recipients for two reasons. First,
housing assistance effectively increases income, either by reducing rent or by
offering access to housing that would otherwise cost more.2 The more income
people have, the more leisure they demand, and the fewer hours they choose to
work; thus, other things being equal, individuals who receive HUD assistance
should work less than those who do not. 
Second, because HUD rental subsidies decrease as income increases, hous-
ing assistance acts as a tax on earnings. An increase of $1 in earnings reduces
the housing subsidy by 30 cents—an implicit tax of 30 percent. This tax leads
to a further decrease in the number of hours worked for any given level of
wages.3 Welfare recipients with and without housing assistance can therefore
be viewed as having two different labor supply curves. Consequently, economic
theory predicts that, other things being equal, welfare recipients who get hous-
FANNIE MAE FOUNDATION
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1 The proportion of welfare recipients receiving housing assistance is based on 2001 HUD
and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services data, as reported in Sard and Waller
(2002). Figures for the proportion of HUD-assisted families that have children and receive
welfare are from Khadduri, Shroder, and Steffen (2003).
2 In Indiana and Delaware, housing assistance does not affect welfare benefits. Also,
welfare benefits have the same effect on federal housing assistance as earnings. Specifically,
welfare benefits are counted as income, and families that get housing assistance contribute 30
percent of their income toward rent. 
3 Assuming that substitution effects dominate income effects so that the labor supply curve
slopes upward, with gross wages on the vertical axis and hours worked on the horizontal axis,
the income effect causes a parallel leftward shift of the labor supply curve, while the implicit tax
causes a further (nonparallel) leftward shift of the curve. For brevity, the discussion in the text
treats housing assistance as if it were the same as cash, a substantial oversimplification. See
Shroder (2002) for further discussion and references. 
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ing assistance should have lower employment rates (at a given wage level) than
their counterparts who do not.
However, economic theory is not clear about the impact of reform on
employment for welfare recipients who get housing assistance compared with
those who do not. In other words, when a state changes its welfare policies to
increase employment and decrease time on welfare, theory does not predict
clearly whether changes in employment and welfare use will be larger or
smaller for recipients who also receive housing assistance compared with those
who do not. For example, suppose welfare reform strengthens work incentives
by allowing recipients to keep more of their benefits when they become
employed (often referred to as an enhanced earnings disregard). At any given
wage level, both welfare recipients who get HUD assistance and those who do
not would choose to work more hours (because their net wage is higher).4
Although the implicit HUD tax will dampen the effect of a more generous earn-
ings disregard for recipients with assistance, theory alone (without specific
assumptions about the shapes of labor supply curves) does not predict which
group will have a larger labor supply response because welfare recipients with
and without housing assistance are on different supply curves.5
This article addresses three principal questions: 
1. Do welfare recipients who receive federal housing assistance have greater
barriers to employment than recipients who do not?
2. How does welfare reform affect the earnings and welfare benefits of recip-
ients who get housing assistance, and are those impacts larger or smaller
than they are for recipients who do not get such assistance?
3. Does welfare reform increase or decrease the use of housing assistance for
welfare recipients who were getting it when the program began?
We address these questions using data from rigorous experimental welfare
reform evaluations in Indiana and Delaware. Recipients in both states were
randomly assigned to a treatment group that was subject to new welfare
reform policies or a control group that was subject to traditional welfare rules.
HOUSING POLICY DEBATE
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4 The portion of the labor supply curves where earnings (gross wages multiplied by hours
worked) are high enough to make recipients ineligible for welfare will not be affected by a
change in the earnings disregard.
5 This discussion is based on a simple static labor supply model. Dynamic models of labor
supply (for example, search theory) produce similar conclusions, although for different reasons.
In a dynamic model, the income effect of housing leads to a higher reservation wage and lower
job acceptance (employment) rates among assisted recipients. Welfare reform should lower the
reservation wage, but might lower it more, less, or equally for recipients with and without hous-
ing assistance. 
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We compare impacts (the difference in average outcomes for the treatment and
control groups) for welfare recipients with and without housing assistance.
Our analysis shows the economic effects of welfare reform on families with and
without housing assistance, but does not show the impacts of housing assis-
tance alone, because sample members were not randomly assigned to the hous-
ing assistance group.
The Indiana sample followed two cohorts totaling 71,000 welfare families
for up to five years. The Delaware sample followed over 3,500 families for 2
years. We matched these families to HUD administrative records to identify
who received housing assistance and what type: public housing, vouchers, or
Section 8 projects.6 Economic outcomes were measured using state adminis-
trative records.
All three types of assistance generally require tenants to contribute 30
percent of their adjusted income toward the cost of shelter, with the remaining
cost borne by the federal government. Public housing projects are owned by
state and local government entities; Section 8 projects are owned by private
entities that have contracts with HUD to subsidize the tenancy of low-income
households; vouchers subsidize low-income families in units of their own
choosing.7
This article builds on previous research in a number of ways. First, it
presents experimental impact estimates of welfare reform for housing assis-
tance subgroups from two states, adding to existing findings from four other
states (Connecticut, Georgia, Ohio, and Minnesota; see Miller et al. 2000,
Riccio and Orenstein 2000, and Verma and Riccio 2003). Second, our study
uses HUD administrative records to determine receipt of housing assistance, a
more accurate source than the survey measures used in previous studies (with
the recent exception of Verma and Riccio 2003). Third, our study uses longi-
tudinal measures of assistance from HUD administrative records to present
FANNIE MAE FOUNDATION
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6 In 1998, Congress combined the pre-existing voucher and certificate programs into a new
voucher program. We assume in this article that the differences between the two old programs,
and between the old programs and the new program, would not have significantly affected the
employment and recipient patterns we are studying, and accordingly we refer to all tenant-based
assistance as “vouchers.”
7 An anonymous reviewer pointed out that the forms of assistance could affect self-suffi-
ciency outcomes, because public housing and Section 8 projects are fixed, while vouchers are
portable. Finding and holding a job might be more difficult, for example, in a depressed neigh-
borhood. The differential impact of program design on self-sufficiency is carefully assessed in
Orr et al.’s interim evaluation of the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment (2004), the
only demonstration in which the form of assistance was randomly assigned. Four to seven years
after random assignment in MTO, the differential impacts on earnings, employment, and
welfare receipt have not been significant. In this study, we report separately on the impact of
welfare reform on those who receive each type of assistance. 
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experimental estimates of the impact of welfare reform on length of time spent
receiving housing assistance. Finally, the welfare reforms instituted in Indiana
and Delaware are in some respects more typical of welfare reform in the United
States than the interventions studied in earlier work.8
Here is a brief preview of our findings: Contrary to the simple economic
theory noted earlier, welfare recipients who get HUD assistance do not have
uniformly lower average levels of employment and earnings than those who do
not. Overall, we find that welfare reform increased employment and earnings
and decreased welfare receipt for Indiana and Delaware recipients with and
without HUD assistance. For the most part, however, the impact did not differ
between groups. An exception appears to lend support to the view that welfare
recipients who get HUD assistance are particularly responsive to increases in
the earnings disregard. Welfare reform also reduced the average length of stay
in housing assistance, particularly in the short run. 
The next section of this article reviews the literature on our three questions.
The third section discusses the specific welfare reform policies in Indiana and
Delaware during the follow-up period. The fourth explains the data and the
estimation techniques we used, the fifth describes the results, and the sixth
presents our conclusions. 
Previous studies
This section summarizes the literature relevant to each of our three
research questions.
Differences in barriers to employment between those who receive
assistance and those who do not
Nationally about a quarter of renters with incomes below 50 percent of an
area’s median income (defined by HUD as “very low income”) receive federal
housing assistance, but the proportion varies substantially by region (Khad-
duri, Shroder, and Steffen 2003). The local processes for rationing this scarce
resource can lead to systematic differences between those who receive assis-
tance and those who do not, often—but not always—favoring those with a
longer history of deprivation. In statewide samples, central-city residents will
be more likely to reside in public housing than rural households, while the use
of vouchers by metropolitan and rural families depends on countervailing
HOUSING POLICY DEBATE
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8 Both Connecticut and Minnesota’s programs had unusually generous earnings disregards.
The Georgia and Ohio evaluations predate welfare reform and are evaluations of alternative
employment and training approaches rather than comprehensive welfare reform programs. 
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forces: Voucher offices will be more accessible in metropolitan areas, but rural
waiting lists are often shorter (Pistilli 2001).
Data from welfare reform experiments in four other states—Connecticut,
Georgia, Minnesota, and Ohio—provide some not entirely consistent evidence
that welfare recipients who get housing assistance are more likely to have char-
acteristics associated with poor success in the labor market than those who do
not (Riccio and Orenstein 2000; Verma and Riccio 2003). In general, the group
that was receiving assistance was more likely to have lower levels of employ-
ment, to be long-term welfare recipients, to be black, and to have more chil-
dren. However, in three of the four sites, the two groups did not differ in high
school attainment.
Among those receiving assistance, the Georgia study found that public
housing residents were more disadvantaged than Section 8 recipients, while the
Ohio study found the reverse. The Connecticut and Minnesota analyses did not
present baseline characteristics by type of assistance.
Nonexperimental studies also tend to show modestly greater barriers
among those who receive assistance than among those who do not, although
the barriers vary—see Bania, Coulton, and Leete 2003, Corcoran and Heflin
2003, Mancuso et al. 2003, Nagle 2003, and Verma and Hendra 2003. Under-
lying regional differences may be responsible for the inconsistency, since these
studies cover Cuyahoga County, OH; a metropolitan area in Michigan; three
suburban Northern California counties; the state of Massachusetts; and Los
Angeles County, respectively.
Differences in the impact of welfare reform 
Results from welfare reform experiments in four other states consistently
show larger employment and earnings impacts for welfare recipients who have
housing assistance than for their counterparts who do not. In the Connecticut
Jobs First program, earnings impacts were more than twice as large for sample
members who received assistance as for those who did not, while in the
Minnesota Family Investment Program, nearly all of the substantial earnings
gains were attributable to families receiving assistance. The earnings impact for
unassisted families was small and not statistically significant (Verma and Riccio
2003). 
Riccio and Orenstein (2000) report on results from two sites for the
National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies. In Atlanta, they found
larger impacts on employment and earnings for families living in public hous-
ing for both labor force attachment programs and human capital development
programs. In Columbus, OH, they found statistically significant earnings gains
FANNIE MAE FOUNDATION
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only for the subgroup of welfare recipients living in public housing. Estimated
earnings impacts were close to zero and not statistically significant for welfare
recipients in both Section 8 and unsubsidized private housing.
Welfare receipt and payment reductions were larger for families that were
receiving HUD assistance than for their unassisted counterparts in the Georgia
and Ohio sites, but no welfare payment impacts were found for families receiv-
ing assistance in Connecticut or Minnesota. For these two sites, however,
impacts on combined income from earnings and welfare payments were posi-
tive and larger for families receiving HUD assistance than for their unassisted
counterparts.
Impacts of welfare reform on tenure in assisted housing
A successful welfare reform might boost recipients’ earnings enough for
them to leave housing assistance early, while an unsuccessful one might cut off
cash assistance without raising earnings and make recipients retain housing
assistance longer. Given the potential effects of welfare reform on housing
assistance and uncertainty about their direction, it is surprising that almost no
rigorous research has addressed this question. The sole exception is Verma and
Riccio’s recent analysis of welfare reform data in Connecticut and Minnesota
(2003). Verma and Riccio (2003) also use HUD administrative data to measure
the receipt of housing assistance over the follow-up period. They found no
evidence that welfare reform affected housing assistance, except for a tempo-
rary reduction in public housing receipt during follow-up year 3. 
Welfare reform experiments in Indiana and Delaware
Indiana and Delaware were two of many states granted waivers by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services to adopt welfare policy changes in
the 1990s. As a condition of the waivers, the department required states to
conduct third-party random-assignment evaluations of the changes. Typically,
a state selected certain counties or local offices to participate in the waiver
demonstration program. Indiana’s demonstration was an exception in that it
applied statewide, while Delaware’s welfare reform was initially implemented
in 5 of the state’s 13 welfare offices. All families receiving welfare in a state’s
demonstration counties during the first year (or longer) were randomly
assigned to be subject to the new welfare reform policies (the treatment group)
or to traditional Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) policies (the
control group). Families typically retained their treatment or control status for
several years.
HOUSING POLICY DEBATE
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The most important change brought about by welfare reform in Indiana
and Delaware, as in most states, was a strengthening of work requirements,
accompanied by tougher sanctions for noncompliance. The other key policies,
in terms of the potential to affect recipients’ behavior, were earnings disregards
and time limits. The following section summarizes these policies in each state
as they applied to the treatment and control groups. 
Indiana
Work requirements and sanctions. Indiana required most adult welfare recipi-
ents in the treatment group to participate in work activities.9 Most clients met
the requirement by working. Those who did not find work were placed in job-
search activities. Sanctions for noncompliance reduced the grant by the adult
portion ($90 per month) for 2 months for the first violation, 12 months for the
second, and 36 months for the third. Control group members were given a
lower priority for referral and consequently had lower participation rates in
job-search and other work activities. Control group members were not subject
to sanctions for noncompliance.
Time limits. Indiana imposed a 24-month limit on welfare receipt for adults
required to participate in work activities. However, the limit affected only the
adult portion of a grant; children remained eligible for assistance after a parent
exceeded the limit. When the limit was reached, the adult portion of the grant
was eliminated for 36 months. In 1997, two years after welfare reform began
in Indiana, adults who reached the 24-month limit became ineligible for assis-
tance for the rest of their lives. Clients in the control group were not subject to
any time limit.
Earnings disregard. For the first five years after welfare reform, Indiana
retained the traditional AFDC earnings disregard, under which each additional
dollar of earnings reduced AFDC benefits by the same amount after a small
work expense allowance.10 This disregard applied to both the treatment and
FANNIE MAE FOUNDATION
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9 Like many states, Indiana and Delaware enacted welfare reform before federal legislation
in the form of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA) took effect. PRWORA did not substantially change Indiana’s and Delaware’s
programs, because the policy changes tested in these demonstrations were generally consistent
with this federal law. PRWORA also allowed states to continue, for several years, welfare reform
policies that were inconsistent with the act if they were part of such demonstrations. 
10 For the first four months of employment, the traditional AFDC disregard ignored the
first $120 in monthly earnings and one-third of additional earnings in calculating the benefit
amount. For the next eight months, a flat $120 in monthly earnings was disregarded. After a
year, the disregard was reduced to $90 per month.
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the control groups. Starting in July 2000, the state introduced a more generous
earnings disregard that applied only to the treatment group. Under that policy,
100 percent of earnings were disregarded until a recipient reached the federal
poverty level. The expanded disregard was designed to strengthen incentives to
work and enable families to increase their incomes by working. 
The early Indiana cohort effectively experienced only the traditional disre-
gard, because just a small proportion of those families were still receiving
Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) in July 2000. In the later cohort,
however, treatment group members still on TANF in July 2000 (approximately
half the group) became subject to the expanded disregard two to three years
after random assignment, depending on when they were assigned. The disre-
gard for the control group did not change. 
The treatment group in the later cohort, therefore, had a much greater
reward for working than either the control group or the treatment group in the
earlier cohort.
Delaware
Work requirements and sanctions. Delaware’s A Better Chance (ABC) welfare
reform program initially required that only adults deemed employable work.
Clients under age 25 with low basic skills were instead referred to basic skills
training. Starting in January 1997, however, work or job search became the
primary required activity for all TANF recipients.
ABC had a relatively aggressive sanction policy for noncompliance and a
high sanction rate in the treatment group. Sanctions were progressive and
could lead to case closure (termination of benefits). Within the first 18 months
of random assignment, approximately half of all adults in the treatment group
had been sanctioned. Control group members were not subject to sanctions.
Time limits. In Delaware, families headed by an employable adult were eligible
for cash assistance for only 24 months but could qualify for up to 24 additional
months of benefits if they worked or participated in ABC’s work experience
program. After 48 months, families were ineligible for cash assistance for 96
months. Clients in the control group were not subject to a time limit.
Earnings disregards. Delaware also retained the traditional AFDC earnings
disregard. However, a “fill-the-gap” budget policy allowed families in the treat-
ment group to keep additional income up to 75 percent of the federal poverty
line. This policy does not seem to have been communicated very effectively.
Just 33 percent of treatment group members knew that they were allowed to
HOUSING POLICY DEBATE
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keep more earnings; by comparison, 84 percent knew about their time limits
(Fein and Karweit 1997). 
Although control group policies in Indiana and Delaware were consistent
throughout our observation period, these states made a few changes to policies
for treatment group members (as noted earlier). Generally, the changes
strengthened incentives to work. A substantial proportion of the treatment
group in the Delaware sample and the early Indiana cohort experienced only
the initial policy environment because they left TANF before policies changed.
The treatment group in the later Indiana cohort experienced stronger work
incentives than the early one; after controlling for differences in characteristics
between the two cohorts, this might be expected to lead to larger impacts.
Overall, the mainstream nature of Indiana and Delaware’s policies suggests
that the results in this article may be relevant to a large proportion of state
welfare reform programs. 
Methodology
This section describes our methodology, including samples and data
sources and the approach to estimating impacts.
Samples
We analyzed three samples of welfare recipients, two cohorts from Indiana
and one from Delaware. Table 1 shows sample sizes for each of the cohorts by
housing status at baseline and treatment or control status.
Early Indiana cohort. This includes all families that received welfare at some
point during the first year of Indiana’s welfare reform program, from May
1995 through April 1996 (excluding “child-only” families that had no adult
subject to work requirements).11 The sample comprises 66,440 families, 95
percent (63,223) in the treatment group and 5 percent (3,217) in the control
group.12 According to HUD administrative data, 19 percent of families in the
early cohort had housing assistance at baseline: About 5 percent lived in public
housing (3,394 families), 5 percent received vouchers (3,478 families), and
FANNIE MAE FOUNDATION
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11 “Child only” refers to welfare cases with no eligible adult. This situation could arise if
adults become ineligible because of sanctions or if children live with family members other than
parents, such as grandparents. Over the past decade, child-only cases have made up an increas-
ing share of the welfare caseload nationally.
12 Although control group sample sizes are small by design, the difference between the
means for the treatment and control groups is still an unbiased estimator of the program effect.
The drawback of smaller or unbalanced sample sizes is that the standard errors of the impact
estimates are larger than they would be if the same sample were more equally balanced. 
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9 percent lived in Section 8 projects (5,819 families). The remaining 81 percent
of the early Indiana cohort (53,749 families) lived in unsubsidized private
housing at baseline. Five years of follow-up data are available for this cohort.
Later Indiana cohort. The cohort, which comprises 4,954 families in 12 Indi-
ana counties, was randomly assigned between March 1998 and February
1999. (Indiana ended statewide random assignment in March 1998. There-
after, random assignment continued for new welfare entrants in 12 selected
counties, rather than in all 92.) In the later cohort, approximately 80 percent
of families (3,863) were assigned to the treatment group and 20 percent
(1,091) to the control group. As described earlier, treatment group members in
the later cohort experienced a somewhat different set of welfare reform poli-
cies than their counterparts in the early cohort (primarily a time limit applied
to a larger proportion of treatment group members and, late in the follow-up
period, an increased earnings disregard). Some 20 percent of welfare families
in the later Indiana cohort received housing assistance at baseline: 5 percent
lived in public housing (235 families), 7 percent received vouchers (335 fami-
lies), and 8 percent lived in Section 8 projects (412 families). Two years of
follow-up data are available for this cohort.
Delaware cohort. The Delaware sample consists of 3,812 families randomly
assigned to the treatment group (2,049 families) or the control group (1,763
HOUSING POLICY DEBATE
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Table 1. Sample Sizes of the Cohorts by Housing Status at Baseline and Treatment
or Control Group
Public Section 8 Unsubsidized 
Cohort Housing Vouchers Projects Housing Total
Early Indiana 
Treatment group 3,207 3,302 5,525 51,189 63,223
Control group 187 176 294 2,560 3,217
Later Indiana 
Treatment group 185 264 310 3,104 3,863
Control group 50 71 102 868 1,091
Delaware 
Treatment group 130 218 211 1,490 2,049
Control group 114 164 165 1,320 1,763
Note: The enrollment dates for the three samples are from May 1995 to April 1996 for the early Indiana
cohort, from March 1998 to February 1999 for the later Indiana cohort, and from October 1995 to September
1996 for the Delaware cohort.
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families) during the first year of ABC—October 1995 through September
1996. Delaware initially operated ABC on a demonstration basis in five local
AFDC offices and ended random assignment of clients in March 1997, at
which point all new applicants in the five pilot offices were enrolled in ABC at
application, and control group members still on the rolls became subject to
welfare reform policies during their next regularly scheduled office visit.
According to HUD administrative data, 26 percent of families in the Delaware
sample were receiving housing assistance at baseline: 6 percent lived in public
housing (244 families), 10 percent received vouchers (382 families), and 10
percent lived in Section 8 projects (376 families). Two years of follow-up data
are available for this sample. 
Data sources 
The analysis is based on a large volume of administrative records and
detailed survey data. Two HUD administrative databases provided information
on receipt of housing assistance. Welfare outcomes and baseline demographics
were measured by means of administrative records from the welfare eligibility
systems in Indiana and Delaware. Employment and earnings data come from
quarterly earnings reports to the states’ unemployment insurance systems.
Client follow-up surveys administered in each state provided data for other
outcomes: neighborhood problems and indicators of financial strain. Both
surveys yielded response rates of 70 percent. Appendix A provides additional
detail on the data sources used, and appendix B describes how HUD data were
matched to the evaluation sample and how assistance was measured.
Approach to estimating impact
The impacts presented in this article are the difference in average outcomes
between members of the treatment and control groups. Outcomes for control
group members represent what would have happened in the absence of the
program. Because random assignment ensures that the treatment and control
groups, on average, are alike in all respects other than exposure to the
program, any significant differences in outcomes can be attributed to it.
The impact analysis focuses on subgroups defined according to receipt of
housing assistance at baseline: public housing, vouchers, Section 8 projects,
and no housing assistance. Because the subgroups were created based on hous-
ing status before random assignment, the impact estimates are free of the selec-
tion bias that is always possible in nonexperimental studies. The impacts
presented in the next section are the difference in average outcomes between
treatment and control group members in each subgroup. 
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Although the experimental design ensures that simple differences in means
are unbiased estimates of program impact, we follow the conventional
approach of adjusting the impact estimates to account for random differences
in baseline characteristics between groups. We used ordinary least squares
regressions, where the independent variable of interest was an indicator of
treatment or control status (1 = treatment, 0 = control), and we controlled for
the following additional characteristics at baseline: age, race or ethnicity,
urbanicity, marital status, and earnings history. The only purpose of the regres-
sion adjustment is to make the impact estimates slightly more precise. 
The larger sample size for the early Indiana cohort means that the same
size impact is more likely to be statistically significant compared with the other
two. We give additional weight, therefore, to the consistency of sign and size
of impact estimates, not just their statistical significance.
Findings
This section presents the expected results and actual findings for each of
our three questions.
Do welfare recipients who receive federally funded housing assistance
have greater barriers to employment than recipients who do not?
Addressing this question involves comparing baseline characteristics to
determine whether welfare families that receive assistance are more disadvan-
taged. One reason why the two groups might differ is that the waiting period
for housing assistance in many areas is several years. Families that remain eligi-
ble for assistance for that long may be more likely to be disadvantaged than
other welfare families.
Understanding how recipients differ on baseline characteristics provides a
context for the impact results we present. For example, other research has
shown that the impacts of welfare reform are sometimes larger for more disad-
vantaged families.13 Therefore, if welfare families with housing assistance in
Indiana and Delaware were more disadvantaged than other welfare recipients,
they might be expected to have experienced larger gains in employment and
larger reductions in welfare receipt than unassisted families. 
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13 Analyses presented in the five-year report on Indiana’s welfare reform program, for
example, show the largest impacts for clients with no recent work history as of random assign-
ment (Beecroft et al. 2003). For an extensive examination of subgroup impacts of welfare
reform, see Michalopoulos and Schwartz (2001).
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In addition, knowing whether and how assisted families differ from other
welfare recipients could help policy makers coordinate housing assistance
programs with the welfare-to-work efforts of welfare agencies and state depart-
ments of labor. If welfare recipients with housing assistance are more disad-
vantaged, agencies may want to target resources or particular services to them
(especially if impacts are larger for this group). 
On the baseline measures most closely related to employment, welfare
recipients who lived in public housing were more disadvantaged than recipients
who did not get assistance. In the early Indiana cohort, public housing residents
were employed in fewer quarters before random assignment, had lower aver-
age earnings, and were more likely to be long-term welfare recipients (table 2,
top panel, first column). In Delaware, public housing residents also used
welfare more than recipients who did not get HUD assistance (table 2, bottom
panel).14 For the later Indiana cohort, public housing residents and adults who
did not receive assistance did not differ in baseline measures of employment,
but that may be partly due to smaller sample sizes, because the difference in
average earnings was nearly as large as for the early cohort (table 2, middle
panel). Across the three cohorts, therefore, public housing residents were signif-
icantly more disadvantaged on three employment-related measures. On the
other baseline measures shown in table 2, public housing residents were gener-
ally more disadvantaged than unassisted welfare recipients.
Unlike public housing residents, recipients of other forms of HUD assis-
tance—voucher users and project-based Section 8 recipients—did not consis-
tently have greater barriers to employment than unassisted welfare recipients.
The relative employability of voucher users differed in the two states. Voucher
users in both Indiana cohorts were more likely to have completed high school
and had higher rates of baseline employment than those in unsubsidized hous-
ing (table 2, second column). Voucher users in Delaware, however, were less
likely to have a high school diploma and were more reliant on welfare than
unassisted sample members. For Section 8 project-based tenants, there was no
clear pattern of baseline differences compared with families in unsubsidized
housing (table 2, third column).
Across all three cohorts and types of housing assistance, the most consis-
tent difference was that families receiving housing assistance were more likely
than other families to be nonwhite. In Indiana, adults in assisted families were
also less likely than adults in unassisted families to be married. (Data on mari-
FANNIE MAE FOUNDATION
446 Wang S. Lee, Erik Beecroft, and Mark Shroder
14 Although the available baseline characteristics differ somewhat by study, the proportion
of welfare recipients in ongoing cases was often used in waiver experiments as a proxy for long-
term welfare receipt.
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tal status were not available for Delaware.) In both states, public housing resi-
dents and voucher users tended to have larger families than those who were not
receiving assistance. Assisted families also had higher rates of welfare and food
stamp receipt (not shown in the table) than other families. These results are
consistent with previous research.
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Table 2. Selected Characteristics of the Cohorts by Housing Status at Baseline
Public Section 8 Unsubsidized 
Cohort Housing Vouchers Projects Housing
Early Indiana 
Proportion with a high school diploma 57.5% 64.1%*** 63.2%*** 57.3%
Proportion nonwhite 63.0%*** 39.0% 54.2%*** 40.3%
Number of quarters employed (out of 5) 1.7*** 2.0*** 2.1*** 1.9
before enrollment 
Average quarterly earnings for 5 quarters $608*** $749 $725 $735
before enrollment
Proportion married 5.1%*** 8.4% 4.4%*** 8.8%
Family size 3.2*** 3.0*** 2.7*** 2.8
Age of the youngest child 4.9 5.7*** 4.1*** 4.8
Proportion on welfare at random 65.4%** 62.6% 69.7%*** 63.3%
assignment
Later Indiana 
Proportion with a high school diploma 52.3% 63.6%*** 52.7% 55.4%
Proportion nonwhite 63.0%*** 60.6%*** 61.2%*** 43.3%
Number of quarters employed (out of 5) 1.8 2.1** 2.1*** 1.8
before enrollment 
Average quarterly earnings for 5 quarters $621 $799 $629* $714
before enrollment
Proportion married 5.5%** 3.9%*** 2.9%*** 8.9%
Family size 2.7 2.8 2.4*** 2.7
Age of the youngest child 3.4** 5.1*** 2.5*** 4.0
Delaware 
Proportion with a high school diploma 51.7% 47.8%* 55.6% 53.4%
Proportion nonwhite 87.3%*** 79.1%*** 73.4%*** 55.6%
Age of the youngest child 4.9 5.7*** 3.9*** 4.5
Proportion with 36 to 60 months of welfare 60.6%*** 67.5%*** 53.3%*** 34.5%
out of the previous 5 years
Number of children 2.7*** 2.6*** 2.2 2.1
Source: Administrative records are from the Indiana Client Eligibility System, Indiana’s unemployment insurance
records, and the Delaware Client Information System. Housing assistance data are from HUD.
*p < 0.1. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01. P values indicate that the means differ significantly from those of welfare
recipients in unsubsidized private housing.
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In addition to these baseline measures, survey data were available for the
early Indiana cohort and for the Delaware sample and reveal interesting differ-
ences across subgroups.15 While welfare recipients in public housing lived in
more distressed neighborhoods than other welfare recipients (not shown),
voucher users did not live in worse neighborhoods than welfare recipients in
unsubsidized housing. The finding that voucher users lived in better neighbor-
hoods than public housing residents is consistent with the design of the
program, which gives recipients more choice about where to live.
In general, recipients getting assistance—both voucher users and public
housing residents—faced less financial strain than their counterparts in unsub-
sidized housing.16 For example, assisted families were less likely to put off
seeing a doctor or dentist because money was lacking, were more likely to pay
their rent in full, and were less likely to move (not shown). These results suggest
that housing assistance may increase financial stability for welfare recipients. 
In summary, the analysis reveals some heterogeneity by type of housing
assistance. Public housing residents may be somewhat more disadvantaged
than welfare recipients who do not get assistance, but voucher users and
Section 8 project-based recipients were not clearly more disadvantaged.
Together with previous research, the results also suggest that disadvantage can
vary by place. Overall, the evidence does not suggest that welfare recipients
who get HUD assistance are consistently much less employable than other
recipients. Our analysis also suggests that housing assistance reduces financial
strain for households. 
How does welfare reform affect the earnings and welfare benefits of
recipients who get housing assistance, and are those impacts larger or
smaller than they are for recipients who do not get such assistance?
Addressing this question involves comparing impacts for subgroups of
welfare recipients defined by type of housing assistance at the time of random
assignment (public housing, vouchers, Section 8 projects, unsubsidized hous-
ing). Most random assignment studies have found that state welfare reform
policies increased low-wage employment, decreased clients’ time on welfare,
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15 Unlike the analysis of baseline characteristics presented earlier, this analysis defines hous-
ing subgroups using administrative data from 2000 to capture housing status at the time the
surveys were conducted. For survey measures, housing status at the time of the survey is prefer-
able to housing status at baseline because family status could have changed.
16 For this specific analysis, it was not possible to identify families in project-based Section
8 housing. Consequently, these families are included in the unsubsidized housing group,
although baseline data suggest that this group is only about one-tenth the size of the unsubsi-
dized housing group.
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and had little or no effect on family income because the decreases in welfare
payments offset the increases in earnings. Very few studies, however, have esti-
mated the impacts on these same economic outcomes separately for welfare
recipients who receive federal housing assistance.
As noted earlier, if welfare reform is more effective for clients who have
housing assistance than for clients who do not, then policy makers may want
to better integrate the programs to take advantage of the positive interaction
between them. If welfare reform is less effective for clients who receive housing
assistance, it is important for policy makers to determine whether the incen-
tives for the two programs interact adversely.
In both Indiana and Delaware, welfare reform increased employment and
earnings and decreased TANF and food stamp payments for all housing assis-
tance subgroups. On average across the three samples (both Indiana cohorts
and the Delaware sample), welfare reform increased employment by about 9
percent and earnings by about 12 percent for the subgroups with housing assis-
tance. Similarly, welfare reform decreased TANF payments and food stamp
payments over the follow-up period by an average of 17 percent and 4 percent,
respectively. In general, the positive impact on earnings was mostly offset by
the negative impacts on TANF and food stamp payments, resulting in no
impact on income.
Tables 3 through 9 show impacts on employment, earnings, TANF pay-
ments, and food stamp payments by follow-up year. Tables 3 through 6 present
impacts for the early Indiana cohort, tables 7 and 8 for the later Indiana cohort,
and table 9 for the Delaware cohort. Although many of the yearly impact esti-
mates are not statistically significant, the figures show generally consistent
patterns over time. The large size of the unsubsidized housing subgroup in the
early Indiana cohort makes it easier to detect statistically significant impacts
than in the other subgroups and samples. 
For the most part, impacts on employment and public assistance were not
statistically different for welfare recipients with housing assistance compared
with their counterparts in private, unsubsidized housing, with the following
exceptions. In the later Indiana cohort, the subgroup that got housing assis-
tance had larger gains in employment and earnings than the subgroup that did
not. In addition, TANF reductions in Delaware were larger for families that got
assistance than for those that did not. 
In summary, for recipients of housing assistance, reform increased earnings
and employment and decreased the use of welfare. Unlike the findings from
previous welfare reform experiments, impact estimates did not differ in size for
the most part between families that received assistance and those that did not.
Where impacts did differ, however, they were larger for assisted families, a find-
ing that is consistent with previous research.
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Table 3. Impacts on Employment for the Early Indiana Cohort
Welfare Traditional
Reform Welfare Percent 
Employment (%) Group Group Difference Change
Last quarter of year 1
Public housing 47.5 47.4 0.1 0.2
Vouchers 51.3 47.2 4.1 8.7
Section 8 projects 52.8 50.3 2.5 5.0
Unsubsidized housing 46.8 44.2 2.6*** 5.9
Last quarter of year 2
Public housing 52.6 53.0 –0.4 –0.8
Vouchers 55.7 50.3 5.4 10.7
Section 8 projects 59.1 61.0 –1.9 –3.1
Unsubsidized housing 51.4 48.0 3.4*** 7.1
Last quarter of year 3
Public housing 56.4 53.0 3.4 6.4
Vouchers 59.1 56.8 2.3 4.1
Section 8 projects 62.2 62.2 0 0
Unsubsidized housing 53.7 49.8 3.9*** 7.9
Last quarter of year 4
Public housing 55.1 55.0 0.1 0.2
Vouchers 60.7 55.5 5.2 9.4
Section 8 projects 62.3 60.1 2.2 3.7
Unsubsidized housing 54.3 50.5 3.8*** 7.6
Last quarter of year 5
Public housing 56.3 50.4 5.9 11.7
Vouchers 58.6 54.7 3.9 7.2
Section 8 projects 60.9 57.7 3.2 5.5
Unsubsidized housing 53.5 50.0 3.5*** 7.0
Ever employed, years 1 through 5
Public housing 88.3 87.4 0.9 1.0
Vouchers 90.5 90.2 0.3 0.4
Section 8 projects 92.4 90.3 2.1 2.3
Unsubsidized housing 87.9 86.0 1.9*** 2.2
Source: Employment data are from Indiana’s unemployment insurance wage records; housing assistance data are
from HUD.
Note: Sample sizes for the subgroups are as follows: public housing, n = 3,394; vouchers, n = 3,478; Section 8
projects, n = 5,819; and unsubsidized housing, n = 53,749. F tests were used to test the null hypothesis of equal
impacts for all subgroups. The null hypothesis was not rejected for any of the outcomes in the table. 
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01. P values indicate that the means differ significantly for the two groups. 
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Table 4. Impacts on Average Earnings for the Early Indiana Cohort
Average Average
Earnings for Earnings for
the Welfare the Traditional Percent
Reform Group ($) Welfare Group ($) Difference ($) Change
Year 1
Public housing 2,454 2,486 –32 –1.3
Vouchers 2,971 2,658 313 11.8
Section 8 projects 3,110 2,798 312 11.2
Unsubsidized housing 2,871 2,637 234*** 8.9
Year 2
Public housing 3,994 4,046 –52 –1.3
Vouchers 4,626 3,920 706 18.0
Section 8 projects 4,800 4,219 581** 13.8
Unsubsidized housing 4,248 3,902 346*** 8.9
Year 3
Public housing 5,069 4,544 525 11.6
Vouchers 5,735 5,324 411 7.7
Section 8 projects 6,179 5,859 320 5.5
Unsubsidized housing 5,260 4,829 431*** 8.9
Year 4
Public housing 5,804 5,120 684 13.4
Vouchers 6,672 5,822 850 14.6
Section 8 projects 7,144 6,385 759* 11.9
Unsubsidized housing 6,038 5,625 413*** 7.3
Year 5
Public housing 6,622 5,541 1,081* 19.5
Vouchers 7,524 7,312 212 2.9
Section 8 projects 8,017 7,343 674 9.2
Unsubsidized housing 6,758 6,203 555*** 8.9
Total, years 1 through 5
Public housing 23,985 21,776 2,209 10.1
Vouchers 27,651 25,102 2,549 10.2
Section 8 projects 29,304 26,664 2,640** 9.9
Unsubsidized housing 25,265 23,262 2,003*** 8.6
Source: Earnings data are from Indiana’s unemployment insurance wage records; housing assistance data are
from HUD.
Note: Sample sizes for the subgroups are as follows: public housing, n = 3,394; vouchers, n = 3,478; Section 8
projects, n = 5,819; and unsubsidized housing, n = 53,749. F tests were used to test the null hypothesis of equal
impacts for all subgroups. The null hypothesis was not rejected for any of the outcomes in the table. 
*p < 0.1. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01. P values indicate that the means differ significantly for the two groups.
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Table 5. Impacts on Average TANF Payments for the Early Indiana Cohort
Average TANF Average TANF 
Payments for the Payments for the
Welfare Reform Traditional Welfare Percent 
Group ($) Group ($) Difference ($) Change
Year 1
Public housing 2,298 2,563 –265*** –10.4
Vouchers 2,030 2,201 –171* –7.8
Section 8 projects 2,041 2,088 –47 –2.2
Unsubsidized housing 1,886 1,977 –91*** –4.6
Year 2
Public housing 1,428 1,574 –146 –9.3
Vouchers 1,118 1,472 –354*** –24.0
Section 8 projects 1,210 1,398 –188** –13.4
Unsubsidized housing 1,042 1,186 –144*** –12.1
Year 3
Public housing 1,040 1,235 –195* –15.8
Vouchers 704 1,011 –307*** –30.4
Section 8 projects 834 1,044 –210** –20.1
Unsubsidized housing 691 891 –200*** –22.4
Year 4
Public housing 763 978 –215* –22.0
Vouchers 480 772 –292*** –37.8
Section 8 projects 594 901 –307*** –34.1
Unsubsidized housing 490 754 –264*** –34.9
Year 5
Public housing 622 869 –247** –28.4
Vouchers 365 586 –221** –37.7
Section 8 projects 467 825 –58*** –43.4
Unsubsidized housing 394 677 –283*** –41.8
Total, years 1 through 5
Public housing 6,150 7,220 –1,070*** –14.8
Vouchers 4,697 6,043 –1,346*** –22.3
Section 8 projects 5,146 6,255 –1,109*** –17.7
Unsubsidized housing 4,504 5,484 –980*** –17.9
Source: Administrative records are from the Indiana Client Eligibility System; housing assistance data are 
from HUD.
Note: Sample sizes for the subgroups are as follows: public housing, n = 3,394; vouchers, n = 3,478; Section 8
projects, n = 5,819; and unsubsidized housing, n = 53,749. F tests were used to test the null hypothesis of equal
impacts for all subgroups. The null hypothesis was not rejected for any of the outcomes in the table. 
*p < 0.1. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01. P values indicate that the means differ significantly for the two groups.
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Table 6. Impacts on Average Food Stamp Payments for the Early Indiana Cohort
Average Average
Food Stamp Food Stamp 
Payments for the Payments for the
Welfare Reform Traditional Welfare Percent
Group ($) Group ($) Difference ($) Change
Year 1
Public housing 2,755 2,932 –177** –6.0
Vouchers 2,520 2,594 –74 –2.9
Section 8 projects 2,364 2,435 –71 –2.9
Unsubsidized housing 2,217 2,269 –52** –2.3
Year 2
Public housing 2,287 2,401 –116 –4.8
Vouchers 1,918 2,199 –281** –12.8
Section 8 projects 1,934 2,061 –127 –6.2
Unsubsidized housing 1,627 1,717 –90*** –5.3
Year 3
Public housing 1,917 1,950 –33 –1.7
Vouchers 1,517 1,725 –208* –12.0
Section 8 projects 1,592 1,644 –52 –3.2
Unsubsidized housing 1,293 1,380 –87*** –6.3
Year 4
Public housing 1,654 1,646 8 0.5
Vouchers 1,245 1,323 –78 –5.9
Section 8 projects 1,361 1,345 16 1.2
Unsubsidized housing 1,086 1,162 –76** –6.5
Year 5
Public housing 1,556 1,516 40 2.6
Vouchers 1,120 1,172 –52 –4.5
Section 8 projects 1,268 1,355 –87 –6.4
Unsubsidized housing 1,005 1,102 –97*** –8.8
Total, years 1 through 5
Public housing 10,168 10,445 –277 –2.7
Vouchers 8,319 9,013 –694 –7.7
Section 8 projects 8,520 8,840 –320 –3.6
Unsubsidized housing 7,229 7,630 –401*** –5.3
Source: Administrative records are from the Indiana Client Eligibility System; housing assistance data are 
from HUD.
Note: Sample sizes for the subgroups are as follows: public housing, n = 3,394; vouchers, n = 3,478; Section 8
projects, n = 5,819; and unsubsidized housing, n = 53,749. F tests were used to test the null hypothesis of equal
impacts for all subgroups. The null hypothesis was not rejected for any of the outcomes in the table. 
*p < 0.1. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01. P values indicate that the means differ significantly for the two groups.
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Table 7. Impacts on Average Earnings and Employment for the 
Later Indiana Cohort
Welfare Traditional
Reform Welfare Percent 
Group Group Difference Change
Average earnings ($)
Year 1
Assisted housing 4,256 3,692 564* 15.3
Unsubsidized housing 4,770 4,642 128 2.8
Year 2
Assisted housing 6,489 5,620 869 15.5
Unsubsidized housing 6,788 7,110 –322 –4.5
Average total earnings, years 1 and 2
Assisted housing 10,777 9,316 1,461* 15.7
Unsubsidized housing 11,593 11,795 –202 –1.7
Employment (%)
Last quarter of year 1
Assisted housing 65.7 58.3 7.4** 12.8
Unsubsidized housing 58.6 57.5 1.1 1.9
Last quarter of year 2
Assisted housing 62.2 55.7 6.5* 11.7
Unsubsidized housing 55.1 56.9 –1.8 –3.2
Ever employed, years 1 and 2
Assisted housing 89.1 88.6 0.5 0.6
Unsubsidized housing 84.3 81.3 3.0** 3.6
Source: Earnings and employment data are from Indiana’s unemployment insurance wage records; housing
assistance data are from HUD.
Note: Sample sizes for the subgroups are as follows: assisted housing, n = 982, and unsubsidized housing, 
n = 3,972. Shaded cells indicate where the F test rejected the null hypothesis of equal subgroup impacts.
*p < 0.1. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01. P values indicate that the means differ significantly for the two groups. 
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Table 8. Impacts on Average TANF Payments and TANF Receipt for the 
Later Indiana Cohort
Welfare Traditional
Reform Welfare Percent 
Group Group Difference Change
Average TANF payments ($)
Year 1
Assisted housing 1,698 1,978 –280*** –14.1
Unsubsidized housing 1,412 1,638 –226*** –13.8
Year 2
Assisted housing 1,043 1,303 –260*** –19.9
Unsubsidized housing 712 902 –190*** –21.1
Average total payments, years 1 and 2
Assisted housing 2,741 3,281 –540*** –16.4
Unsubsidized housing 2,123 2,540 –417*** –16.4
Average food stamp payments ($)
Year 1
Assisted housing 2,290 2,278 12 0.5
Unsubsidized housing 1,811 1,762 49 2.8
Year 2
Assisted housing 1,853 2,006 –153 –7.7
Unsubsidized housing 1,241 1,310 –69 –53
Average total payments, years 1 and 2
Assisted housing 4,143 4,284 –141 –3.3
Unsubsidized housing 3,052 3,071 –19 –0.6
Source: Administrative records are from the Indiana Client Eligibility System; housing assistance data are 
from HUD.
Note: Sample sizes for the subgroups are as follows: assisted housing, n = 982, and unsubsidized housing, 
n = 3,972. F tests were used to test the null hypothesis of equal impacts for all subgroups. The null hypothesis
was not rejected for any of the outcomes in the table. 
*p < 0.1. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01. P values indicate that the means differ significantly for the two groups. 
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Table 9. Impacts on Average Earnings, Employment, and TANF Payments for the
Delaware Cohort
Welfare Traditional
Reform Welfare Percent 
Group Group Difference Change
Average earnings ($)
Year 1
Assisted housing 2,744 2,195 548*** 25.0
Unsubsidized housing 2,690 2,419 271** 11.2
Year 2
Assisted housing 4,069 4,026 43 1.1
Unsubsidized housing 4,076 4,029 47 1.2
Average total earnings, years 1 and 2
Assisted housing 6,813 6,222 591 9.5
Unsubsidized housing 6,766 6,448 318 4.9
Employment (%)
Last quarter of year 1
Assisted housing 54.1 43.9 10.2*** 23.2
Unsubsidized housing 49.4 44.4 5.0*** 11.2
Last quarter of year 2
Assisted housing 58.5 60.7 –2.2 –3.7
Unsubsidized housing 54.1 51.5 2.6 5.1
Ever employed, years 1 and 2
Assisted housing 82.6 82.4 0.2 0.2
Unsubsidized housing 81.4 79.0 2.4** 3.0
Average TANF payments ($)
Year 1
Assisted housing 2,748 2,979 –231*** –7.8
Unsubsidized housing 2,299 2,405 –106** –4.4
Year 2
Assisted housing 1,332 1,866 –534*** –28.6
Unsubsidized housing 968 1,285 –317*** –24.7
Average total payments, years 1 and 2
Assisted housing 4,080 4,845 –765*** –15.8
Unsubsidized housing 3,267 3,690 –422*** –11.5
Source: Earnings and employment data are from Delaware’s unemployment insurance wage records; housing
assistance data are from HUD.
Note: Sample sizes for the subgroups are as follows: assisted housing, n = 1,002, and unsubsidized housing, 
n = 2,810. Shaded cells indicate where the F test rejected the null hypothesis of equal subgroup impacts.
*p < 0.1. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01. P values indicate that the means differ significantly for the two groups. 
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There could be more than one reason why clients getting assistance had
larger impacts on employment and earnings in the later Indiana cohort but not
in the early one or in Delaware. The follow-up period for the later Indiana
cohort coincided with an especially strong state economy, with unemployment
rates hovering around 3 percent. It is possible that a strong economy benefits
recipients of place-based housing assistance more than other welfare recipients
because the greater mobility is worth less when the economy is strong and jobs
are easy to get everywhere.17 However, control group members were living in
the same economy. The simplest explanation seems to be that the strengthened
disregard policy, which took effect in Indiana during the two-year follow-up
period for the later cohort, triggered a greater response among assisted clients. 
Beyond the experimental impacts, an examination of average outcome
levels shows that, across all three samples, assisted subgroups more often than
not had higher employment rates than unassisted subgroups. As noted earlier,
this is the opposite of what economic theory would predict, and it is also
surprising given the analysis of baseline characteristics, which found that the
groups receiving housing assistance are not less disadvantaged than other
welfare recipients. An intriguing question for future research is why employ-
ment rates are not lower for welfare recipients who get assistance.18 
Does welfare reform increase or decrease the use of housing assistance
for those who were getting it when the program began?
In contrast to the previous question, which focused on the economic
impacts for subgroups defined by housing assistance status at baseline, this
question focuses on housing assistance as an outcome. Welfare reform could
either increase or decrease the use of housing assistance. By increasing employ-
ment and earnings, welfare reform could reduce the need for, and thereby
hasten exits from, housing assistance. However, families that are getting hous-
ing assistance and leave welfare involuntarily because of sanctions or time
limits may have a greater need for assistance and so may be less likely to leave
it. Welfare reform might also affect housing assistance by changing family
structure—for example, by increasing marriage rates (which could increase the
likelihood of exiting assistance) or increasing the proportion of child-only fami-
lies (which could decrease the likelihood of exiting assistance).
17 Table 1 shows that residents of public housing and Section 8 projects, both place-based,
dominate the assisted housing group. 
18 A possible explanation, based partly on the results of our analysis, is that housing assis-
tance provides families with stability, and stability makes it easier for people to become or
remain employed. 
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The micro or individual effects of welfare reform on housing assistance
have macro implications for HUD programs. Changes in income induced by
welfare reform affect the subsidy amounts needed for families living in public
housing or Section 8 projects or using vouchers. Welfare reform induced–
changes in the duration of housing assistance would affect the length of wait-
ing lists.
Just as welfare reform reduced the receipt of other forms of public assis-
tance (TANF and food stamps), it had negative impacts on housing assistance.
For the early Indiana cohort, welfare reform increased the rate of exit from
public housing in the first two years of follow-up, although the impact faded
in subsequent years (figure 1).19 For families using vouchers at baseline, welfare
reform decreased voucher use in year 5, but not earlier in the follow-up period
(figure 2). The reason for the different timing of impacts for public housing and
vouchers is not known.20 The negative impact of welfare reform on housing
assistance implies a small decrease in the waiting lists, but also raises the ques-
tion of whether the additional families leave housing assistance because of
improvements in their financial or living situations and continue to be finan-
cially stable.
Conclusion
For two of the three cohorts examined, we find no evidence that welfare
reform had different employment and earnings impacts for recipients who
receive housing assistance compared with those who do not. For both groups,
reform increased employment and earnings and decreased welfare receipt. The
exception is the later Indiana cohort, where the subgroup getting assistance had
larger gains in employment and earnings than the unassisted subgroup. In
terms of TANF receipt, reductions for families in Delaware were larger for
those who got assistance than for those who did not. Table 10 summarizes the
impact findings.
The pattern of earnings and employment impacts for the three cohorts in
this study and previous research in Minnesota and Connecticut suggests that
welfare recipients getting assistance may have larger responses than unassisted
families to more generous earnings disregards, provided that they are clearly
19 This analysis is presented only for the early Indiana cohort because the longer follow-up
period makes the results more informative.
20 We investigated one possible line of causation: Perhaps welfare reform increased the like-
lihood of moving, and moving increased the likelihood of exiting from housing assistance. Indi-
ana follow-up survey data, however, do not fully support this speculation. Although welfare
reform increased the likelihood of moving for voucher users, it decreased the likelihood for
public housing residents and had no impact for sample members in unsubsidized housing.
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Figure 1. Impacts on Public Housing Receipt for Sample Members, for Families in
Public Housing at Random Assignment, Early Indiana Cohort (N = 3,394) 
Note: *p < 0.1 indicates significant differences in means between the two groups.
•▲
Welfare Reform Group                    Traditional Welfare Group
Figure 2. Impacts on Voucher Receipt, for Families Using Vouchers at Random
Assignment, Early Indiana Cohort (N = 3,478) 
Note: **p < 0.05 indicates significant differences in means between the two groups.
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Table 10. Summary of Subgroup Experimental Impact Findings Based on
Administrative Data
TANF Food Stamp Use of Use of 
Employment Earnings Payments Payments Public Housing Vouchers
Early Indiana ND ND ND ND Treatment group Treatment group 
Cohort exits from uses vouchers 
public housing significantly
more quickly in less, but only
years 1 and 2 by year 5
Later Indiana LGHA LGHA ND ND X X
Cohort
Delaware ND ND LRHA X X X
Connecticut LGHA LGHA ND X Temporary ND
reduction in 
public housing 
receipt during 
year 3
Minnesota LGHA LGHA LGNHA X ND (analysis combines public 
housing with vouchers)
Source: Results for Connecticut and Minnesota are from Verma and Riccio (2003). 
Note: ND = no difference across housing assistance subgroups; LGHA = larger gain for the housing assistance
subgroup; X = data not available; LGNHA = larger gain for the non-housing-assisted subgroup; LRHA = larger
reduction for the housing assistance subgroup. Since Connecticut and Minnesota have considerably more gener-
ous earnings disregards than Indiana or Delaware, the results for TANF payments are not directly comparable.
communicated. The Minnesota and Connecticut samples and the later Indiana
cohort all had larger employment and earnings impacts for clients receiving
assistance, and all had more generous earnings disregards for the treatment
group. The early Indiana cohort did not have larger earnings and employment
impacts for clients getting assistance, but also did not have more generous earn-
ings disregards. The Delaware sample showed no difference in earnings
impacts for the assisted subgroup and did have a more generous disregard
(though less generous than the later Indiana cohort). The evidence from survey
research, however, is that the more generous disregard was not understood
nearly as well as the harsher aspects of the Delaware reform.
The research to date suggests therefore that earnings disregards may
disproportionately affect welfare recipients who get housing assistance,
perhaps as a consequence of the interactions among the implicit taxes in the
welfare and housing programs. Future research can attempt to validate this
hypothesis with other samples and identify the reasons that assisted families
may have a greater response to more generous earnings disregards. 
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Another issue for future research is how the findings to date may be
affected by the federal five-year time limit on TANF receipt, which none of the
sample members in this study reached during the follow-up period, and by
increased work requirements as a result of TANF reauthorization. 
We also find some evidence that welfare reform decreased the use of
housing assistance for both public housing residents and voucher users. The
timing of these reductions differed for reasons that are unclear. It is natural to
view these effects as indicators of welfare success. We caution, however, that
although reduced use of housing assistance is to be welcomed if it is a by-
product of increased employment and earnings, it may be a side effect of
reduced family stability as well. 
Contrary to both simple economic theory and our analysis of baseline
characteristics, as a whole, welfare recipients who get assistance do not have
lower levels of average employment and earnings than those who do not.
Together with the findings that welfare reform impacts were not smaller (and
were in some cases larger) for assisted recipients, our research finds no evidence
that these clients need extra help to meet the demands of welfare reform.
Nevertheless, both this work and previous research show that most welfare
recipients, regardless of whether they get housing assistance or not, remain in
poverty several years after being subject to welfare reform.
The intriguing finding that assisted families exhibit fewer signs of financial
strain than other welfare recipients suggests an important benefit of housing
assistance. The additional financial stability it confers may facilitate the transi-
tion from welfare to work. 
Appendix A
Data sources used in the analysis
Our analysis is based on administrative records and survey data.
HUD administrative data. Information on receipt of housing assistance comes
from two databases:
1. Multifamily Tenant Characteristics System (MTCS) data contain records
of families that receive assistance under HUD’s public housing, voucher,
Section 8 certificate, and Section 8 moderate rehabilitation programs.21
Public housing authorities submit records to MTCS. 
21 Section 8 certificates, which preceded vouchers, are treated as vouchers in our analysis.
Families in Section 8 moderate rehabilitation projects are grouped with families in other Section
8 projects.
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2. Tenant Rental Assistance Certification System (TRACS) data include
records of families subsidized under the Section 8 new construction, sub-
stantial rehabilitation, and loan-management set-aside programs, along
with families that live in privately owned subsidized multifamily projects
but do not receive Section 8 assistance. Private owners who have direct
contracts with HUD submit records to TRACS.22
Appendix B describes how HUD data were matched to the evaluation
sample and how assistance is measured.
Other administrative data. Outcomes data come from state welfare databases
and quarterly wage records for unemployment insurance.
1. The Indiana Client Eligibility System (ICES) provided information on the
welfare eligibility, food stamp eligibility, and employment and training
activities of all welfare recipients in Indiana. Our analyses are based on
longitudinal files created from monthly ICES extracts.
2. The Delaware Client Information System (DCIS) provided data on the
welfare eligibility of all welfare recipients in Delaware. Our analyses are
based on longitudinal files created from monthly DCIS extracts. 
3. Unemployment insurance wage system records from Indiana and
Delaware show total earnings by calendar quarter. These data are inde-
pendent of welfare status and can be used to examine employment and
earnings for the entire sample over time. For Indiana, data are available
from the beginning of the demonstration. For Delaware, data are available
from the third quarter of 1996. 
Survey data. Client follow-up surveys were administered in each state.
1. The Indiana Wave 2 survey interviews were completed with 2,359 families
that received welfare during the first year of the state welfare reform
program (the early cohort). Approximately three-quarters of the interviews
were conducted in respondents’ homes; the rest were conducted by tele-
phone. Survey interviews were conducted between March and November
2000, on average five years after the families became subject to the state’s
welfare reform policies. The survey response rate was 70 percent.
22 For our analysis, families that live in subsidized projects (e.g., Section 236 projects or
Section 221(b)(3) below-market interest rate projects) but do not receive Section 8 assistance are
grouped with families in Section 8 projects.
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2. The Delaware Wave 2 survey interviews were completed with 1,599 adults
who received TANF benefits at some point between October 1995 and
December 1996. Survey interviews were conducted by telephone between
September 1999 and July 2000. As was the case with the Indiana survey,
the response rate was 70 percent.
Appendix B
Measuring housing assistance at baseline
To analyze subgroups in a way that retains the advantages of experimen-
tal design for measuring the impact of a policy intervention, it is necessary to
define subgroups using information from the time of random assignment. That
is, the characteristics that define the subgroup should not be endogenous. They
should not be something that happened during the experiment and could have
been affected by the intervention itself.
Ideally, therefore, the information used to construct subgroups should
consist of whether a welfare recipient is receiving housing assistance (and what
type) at baseline—during the month of random assignment. However, this
would require matching HUD administrative data files for the specific month
in which random assignment took place to welfare recipients’ records, and this
was not feasible. The best available files with historical data on the households
that receive housing assistance are assembled, cleaned, and stored once or twice
a year, not monthly. 
There are two HUD data systems on households that receive housing assis-
tance. The MTCS contains records of families subsidized under the public
housing, certificate, voucher, and Section 8 moderate rehabilitation programs.
The TRACS contains records of families subsidized under the Section 8 new
construction, substantial rehabilitation, and loan-management set-aside pro-
grams, along with several other programs that subsidize units in specific
privately owned projects. Public housing authorities submit records to MTCS,
while private owners with direct contractual relationships submit records to
TRACS. We matched the samples of welfare clients in the Indiana and Dela-
ware experiments to the MTCS and TRACS and accepted all matches, regard-
less of program. We created four subgroups based on housing assistance status:
1. Welfare recipients living in public housing
2. Welfare recipients using vouchers (including both certificates and vouchers)
3. Welfare recipients living in Section 8 projects (in units with Section 8
moderate rehabilitation, new construction, substantial rehabilitation, or
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loan-management set-aside subsidies, or in units in other privately owned
assisted housing projects that report data to TRACS)
4. Welfare recipients who were not found in MTCS or TRACS and were clas-
sified as living in unsubsidized private market housing (or, put another
way, not receiving housing assistance)
We may have misclassified the housing assistance status of some welfare
recipients in the Indiana and Delaware samples for two reasons.
Inaccurate reporting. First, MTCS and TRACS reporting could be incomplete
or inaccurate. Unlike state welfare files, which are kept by the agency actually
making payments to households, with recording triggered by the payments
themselves, MTCS and TRACS data are reported to HUD by local public
housing authorities (PHAs) or private owners, with at best a short lag. Some
data may simply never be reported. Recording is not triggered by a specific
monthly payment, but by several events in the process of assisting a particular
household. These include admission to a housing assistance program, recertifi-
cation of income eligibility and the applicable level of rent subsidy (which
should occur every 12 months), and the end of the household’s participation in
the program. A PHA or private owner may fail to report a household’s record
at admission or recertification, and this could lead us to fail to match a recipi-
ent to a housing assistance program. Or a PHA or owner may fail to submit
an “end-of-participation” record, and this could lead us to identify a household
that was no longer receiving housing assistance as still receiving it at random
assignment.
Timing of MTCS and TRACS files compared with random assignment. In
addition, because we could not use monthly MTCS and TRACS files, we may
have misclassified a few welfare recipients as getting assistance at baseline
when it really started after random assignment. The following tables suggest
the extent of the possible misclassification resulting from the timing of the
MTCS and TRACS files: Table B.1 illustrates the timing of the matching proce-
dure for the early Indiana cohort.
The last column in the table shows the maximum number of months of
endogenous housing assistance data (the months after random assignment
during which the welfare recipient could have begun to receive housing assis-
tance).23 The criteria for which MTCS or TRACS file to use to match data were
23 If two numbers are shown in the column, the first refers to matching on the MTCS data
and the second to matching on the TRACS data. If only one number is shown, the same number
applies to both MTCS and TRACS data.
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chosen, not to minimize the number of endogenous months, but to ensure that
the fewest matches would be lost. For example, March 1996 enrollees could
have been matched to the December 1995 MTCS/TRACS files instead of the
December 1996 files. In this case, there would have been no possible endoge-
nous months. But the trade-off is that welfare clients who entered housing
assistance between December 1995 and February 1996 would have been incor-
rectly classified as living in unsubsidized, private market housing at baseline. 
Tables B.2 and B.3 illustrate the matching procedure for the later Indiana
cohort and for the Delaware cohort. 
Table B.1. Matching HUD Data for the Early Indiana Cohort
Maximum Number of  
Month of Random Endogenous Months 
Assignment MTCS Data Used TRACS Data Used (MTCS/TRACS)
May 1995 May 1995 December 1995 0/6
June 1995 December 1995 December 1995 5
July 1995 December 1995 December 1995 4
August 1995 December 1995 December 1995 3
September 1995 December 1995 December 1995 2
October 1995 December 1995 December 1995 1
November 1995 December 1995 December 1995 0
December 1995 December 1995 December 1995 0
January 1996 December 1996 December 1996 10
February 1996 December 1996 December 1996 9
March 1996 December 1996 December 1996 8
April 1996 December 1996 December 1996 7
Note: Endogenous months are the number of months a welfare recipient may have been exposed to welfare
reform before beginning to receive housing assistance.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 1
6:2
4 3
0 O
cto
be
r 2
01
3 
FANNIE MAE FOUNDATION
466 Wang S. Lee, Erik Beecroft, and Mark Shroder
Table B.2. Matching HUD Data for the Later Indiana Cohort
Maximum Number of  
Month of Random Endogenous Months 
Assignment MTCS Data Used TRACS Data Used (MTCS/TRACS)
March 1998 May 1998 June 1998 1/2
April 1998 May 1998 June 1998 0/1
May 1998 May 1998 June 1998 0
June 1998 May 1999 June 1998 10/0
July 1998 May 1999 June 1999 9/10
August 1998 May 1999 June 1999 8/9
September 1998 May 1999 June 1999 7/8
October 1998 May 1999 June 1999 6/7
November 1998 May 1999 June 1999 5/6
December 1998 May 1999 June 1999 4/5
January 1999 May 1999 June 1999 3/4
February 1999 May 1999 June 1999 2/3
Note: Endogenous months are the number of months a welfare recipient may have been exposed to welfare
reform before beginning to receive housing assistance.
Table B.3. Matching HUD Data for the Delaware Cohort
Maximum Number of  
Month of Random Endogenous Months 
Assignment MTCS Data Used TRACS Data Used (MTCS/TRACS)
October 1995 December 1995 December 1995 1
November 1995 December 1995 December 1995 0
December 1995 December 1995 December 1995 0
January 1996 December 1996 December 1996 10
February 1996 December 1996 December 1996 9
March 1996 December 1996 December 1996 8
April 1996 December 1996 December 1996 7
May 1996 December 1996 December 1996 6
June 1996 December 1996 December 1996 5
July 1996 December 1996 December 1996 4
August 1996 December 1996 December 1996 3
September 1996 December 1996 December 1996 2
Note: Endogenous months are the number of months a welfare recipient may have been exposed to welfare
reform before beginning to receive housing assistance.
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